NSSCryptoModuleSpec/Section 9: Self Tests: Difference between revisions
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[http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.20.01 VE.09.20.01 ] | [http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.20.01 VE.09.20.01 ] | ||
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* [http://wiki.mozilla.org/Power_Up_Selftests Power- | * [http://wiki.mozilla.org/Power_Up_Selftests Power-up tests ] | ||
* Conditional tests | * Conditional tests | ||
** Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys) | ** Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys): the module performs the pair-wise consistency test specified in FIPS 140-2 Section 4.9.2 when it generates RSA, DSA, and ECDSA key pairs. | ||
** Continuous random number generator test | ** Continuous random number generator test: the module performs the continuous random number generator test specified in FIPS 140-2 Section 4.9.2 that tests for failure to a constant value. | ||
** No other conditional tests are performed | ** In addtion to power up, NSS also performs health checks on the random number generate at instantiate and reseed time. | ||
** No other conditional tests are performed. | |||
These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of | These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of | ||
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[http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.22.03 VE.09.22.03 ] | [http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.22.03 VE.09.22.03 ] | ||
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[http://wiki.mozilla.org/FIPS_Operational_Environment#Software_Integrity_Test Software Integrity Test] | |||
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The critical security functions of the cryptographic module are: | The critical security functions of the cryptographic module are: | ||
* Random number generation. Used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by Approved cryptographic algorithms. Tested by the | * Random number generation. Used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by Approved cryptographic algorithms. Tested by the random number generator health tests on power up, instantiate and reseed time and the conditional [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/nss-source/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/prng_fips1861.c.dep.html#alg_fips186_2_cn_1 continuous random number generator test]. | ||
* Operation of the cryptographic algorithms. Used for encryption, decryption, and authentication. Tested by the power-up [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/nss-source/mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/fipstest.c.html cryptographic algorithm tests] and the conditional [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/nss-source/mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.dep.html#sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck pairwise consistency test] (when the module generates public and private keys). | * Operation of the cryptographic algorithms. Used for encryption, decryption, and authentication. Tested by the power-up [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/nss-source/mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/fipstest.c.html cryptographic algorithm tests] and the conditional [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/fips/nss-source/mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c.dep.html#sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck pairwise consistency test] (when the module generates public and private keys). | ||
|| Draft | || Draft | ||
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[http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.43.01 VE.09.43.01 ] | [http://wiki.mozilla.org/VE_09#VE.09.43.01 VE.09.43.01 ] | ||
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There is only one random number generator (RNG) used in the NSS cryptographic module. The RNG is an Approved RNG, implementing Algorithm Hash_DRBG of [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90/SP800-90revised_March2007.pdf NIST SP 800-90]. | |||
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|| Draft | || Draft | ||
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Latest revision as of 12:03, 11 May 2015
Note: This is a draft - A work in progress! - Not official.
Document Description |
DTR Section |
Assessment |
Status | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
List every error state & error indicator - Document all error states associated with each self-test, and indicate for each error state the expected error indicator. |
VE.09.04.01 |
Failure of any of the power-up, conditional, or operator-initiated self-tests causes the cryptographic module to enter the Error state (State 3 ). If the pairwise consistency test fails, the
|
Draft | ||||
Module in Error State: Ensure that cryptographic operations cannot be performed and all data output via the data output interface is inhibited while the module is in the error state. See VE02.06.01 for the vendor design requirement. |
All the PKCS #11 functions that perform cryptographic operations or output data check the Boolean state variable |
Draft | |||||
List and describe the power-up & conditional self-tests performed by the module |
VE.09.07.01 VE.09.13.01 VE.09.16.01 VE.09.18.01 VE.09.18.02 VE.09.19.01 VE.09.19.02 VE.09.20.01 |
These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. |
Draft | ||||
For each error condition, document the actions neccessary to clear the condition and resume normal operation. |
VE.09.07.02 |
The cryptographic module has only one Error state, which is entered when any self-test fails. The error code |
Draft | ||||
Describe automatic initiation of power-up self-tests requires that the running of power-up self-tests not involve any inputs from or actions by the operator. |
VE.09.09.01 |
When the |
Draft | ||||
Results of power-up self-tests successful completion indicator for the power-up self-tests. |
VE.09.10.01 |
The |
Draft | ||||
Procedure by which an operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand |
VE.09.12.01 |
The operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand by calling the |
Draft | ||||
specify the method used to compare the calculated output with the known answer. |
|
Draft | |||||
Error State when two outputs are not equal. |
When the two outputs are not equal, the module enters the Error state (by setting the Boolean state variable |
Draft | |||||
Independant cryptographic algorithm implemenations | VE.09.20.02 |
(N/A) The NSS cryptographic module doesn't include two independent implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm. |
Draft | ||||
Integrity test for software components |
Draft | ||||||
EDC for software integrity | VE.09.24.01 | (N/A) | |||||
Critical functions test |
The critical security functions of the cryptographic module are:
|
Draft | |||||
Key transport method |
RSA encryption (Key Wrapping using RSA keys) is the only key transport
method that VE.09.31.01 applies to. The pairwise consistency check, as defined in AS09.31, is implemented in the |
Draft | |||||
Digital signatures |
The |
Draft | |||||
Approved authentication technique used for the software/firmware load test |
N/A. No software or firmware components can be externally loaded into the cryptographic module. |
Draft | |||||
Manual Key Entry Test |
(N/A) The cryptographic module does not support manual key entry. | ||||||
Random number generator is implemented, document the continuous RNG test performed |
There is only one random number generator (RNG) used in the NSS cryptographic module. The RNG is an Approved RNG, implementing Algorithm Hash_DRBG of NIST SP 800-90. |
Draft | |||||
Bypass Test | (N/A) NSS does not implement a bypass service. | Draft |
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