Security/Foreign Certificate Warning: Difference between revisions

→‎Related: link to Chromium security-dev thread
(→‎Challenges: add "private CA" (for internal sites) challenge)
(→‎Related: link to Chromium security-dev thread)
 
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{{warning|This is just a draft proposal for a new Firefox feature}}
{{warning|This is just a draft proposal for a new Firefox feature}}
[[File:Root-cert-banner1.png|800px|thumb|right|Initial idea]]


== Description ==
== Description ==
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of the chain for the currently visited site.
of the chain for the currently visited site.


[[File:Root-cert-banner2.png|1600px|thumb|center|Revised version which takes advantage of unused UI real estate]]
=== Non-dimissability ===
[[File:Foreign-cert-warning-flow.png|300px|thumb|right|Flow]]
[[File:Root-cert-banner2.png|300px|thumb|right|Toolbar Indicator]]
[[File:Foreign-cert-warning-page.PNG|300px|thumb|right|Information Page]]
 
There are three axes to look at when considering how ''dismissable'' the banner should be:
 
* How easy is it to dismiss?
*# It's not dismissable at all.
*# You need to click on the banner, read the explanation page, and scroll down to find the "dismiss" button.
*# You click the X on the banner.
* How long does it stay dismissed?
*# It shows up next time you navigate to a page that meets the triggering conditions.
*# It's gone until you close the browser.
*# It's gone for 30 days.
*# It's gone forever (in that browser profile).
* How hidden is it once it's dimissed?
*# The message is shorter, but it's still there.
*# It gets down to just a warning icon (which could expand when you mouse over it).
*# It's completely gone from the UI.


== Requirements ==
== Requirements ==
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# The name of the certificate issuer is under the controller of the person minting the cert (i.e. the attacker in malicious cases).
# The name of the certificate issuer is under the controller of the person minting the cert (i.e. the attacker in malicious cases).
# Organizations using private CAs would be affected by this even though in this case there is no MITM (see [https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=81623#c20 rsleevi's comment] on a similar feature).
# Organizations using private CAs would be affected by this even though in this case there is no MITM (see [https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=81623#c20 rsleevi's comment] on a similar feature).
#* This may not be perceived as bad for internal sites as [https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=81623#c28 suggested by mnot].
#* It's not clear whether this would be perceived as bad for internal sites (see [https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=81623#c28 mnot's comment]).
# Giving users a simple explanation for why this is something they should worry about and giving them some actionable suggestions for resolution/mitigation.


== Related ==
== Related ==


* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1135776 Bug 1135776]: show a different UI for certificates issued by non-built-in root certificates
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1135776 Bug 1135776]: show a different UI for certificates issued by non-built-in root certificates
* [https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=81623 Chromium bug 81623] (equivalent Chromium bug)
* [https://docs.google.com/a/mozilla.com/presentation/d/1TNFx6eaQVfe83PV80-FZ39QY1dSLGCWW8f2i5-NeJ48/edit Improving SSL warnings], a presentation by Adrienne Porter Felt, Chrome Security Team
* [https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/topic/security-dev/alqnzXj2bjI/discussion Discussion on why Chrome hasn't done it yet]
* Android shows a similar warning when using a VPN app:
<gallery mode=packed heights="400px">
File:Android-vpn-warning1.png|warning in the settings panel
File:Android-vpn-warning2.png|explanation page (after clicking on warning)
</gallery>
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