CA/Subordinate CA Checklist: Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 20:13, 23 March 2017

2,891 bytes added , 23 March 2017

Added Non-disclosable Intermediate Certificates section

Kathleen Wilson

Confirmed users, Administrators

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 # Review the CP/CPS for [http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices Potentially Problematic Practices.] Provide further info when a potentially problematic practice is found.
 # If the root CA audits do not include this sub-CA, then for this sub-CA provide a publishable statement or letter from an auditor that meets the requirements of sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion policy.]
+== Non-disclosable Intermediate Certificates ==
+In order to best ensure the safety and security of Mozilla users, Mozilla has a single consistent [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ policy] that describes the expectations for all CAs that will be trusted within its program. Mozilla requires that all participating root CAs fully disclose their hierarchy, including CP, CPS, and audits, when said hierarchy is capable of issuance.
+If you have intermediate certificates for which you cannot disclose this information, whether it be for personal, operational, or legal reasons, then an appropriate solution, consistent with [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ Mozilla CA Certificate Policy], is to use Technically Constrained Subordinate CAs (TCSCAs) - as defined within the [[CA:BaselineRequirements|Baseline Requirements]] and as reflected within Mozilla's policy. Such TCSCAs are technically limited from the issuance of TLS/SSL certificates, and by doing so, are allowed to be operated without full [[CA:SalesforceCommunity#Which_intermediate_certificate_data_should_CAs_add_to_Salesforce.3F|public disclosure of their CP, CPS, and audit documentation]].
+For example, if these subCAs are not used for the production of TLS/SSL certificates, but only identity certificates, then you can make use of the Extended Key Usage extension on the sub-CA to ensure it is present, and that it *lacks* the id-kp-serverAuth and anyExtendedKeyUsage extensions.
+Alternatively, you can consider restructuring a CA hierarchy such that you have
+:::/-Private Sub CA 1
+::/--Private Sub CA 2
+:Root
+::\
+:::\-BR-compliant Public Intermediate
+::::\
+:::::\----BR-compliant SubCA1
+::::::\---BR-compliant SubCA2
+:::::::\--BR-compliant SubCA3
+That is, in this structure, an additional intermediate is inserted into your PKI which distinguishes the "private" (confidential) sub-CAs, and the publicly audited, publicly disclosed set of sub-CAs. In this scenario, rather than all chaining directly to the Root, they transit a newly introduced intermediate. It is this newly introduced intermediate that you would 'apply' for inclusion to Mozilla as the root, even if operationally, your government might use and rely on "Root" for the broader purpose of digital signature identification or operational management.
+The point of this is that Mozilla Policy requires that all nodes signed by the trust anchor (using the RFC5280 terminology, since it doesn't need to be a self-signed cert), whether it's 'root' or 'BR-compliant Public Intermediate', MUST be operated and disclosed in a way consistent with Mozilla Policy. If you have a 'private' PKI (even if it's publicly operated for the benefit of citizens and/or customers), then it MUST be a sibling-or-parent node in the PKI tree, and MUST NOT be a child node.