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Security/ProcessIsolation/ThreatModel: Difference between revisions
→Threats
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====Threats==== | ====Threats==== | ||
*code execution in a privileged process (inc. a library it loads) could result in direct system compromise | *code execution in a privileged process (inc. a library it loads) could result in direct system compromise | ||
*isolated process could trick a privileged process to perform an attack on its behalf (write a file to an arbitrary location on disk, write a registry entry, launch a process, open a socket, etc) | *isolated process could trick a privileged process to perform an attack on its behalf (write a file to an arbitrary location on disk, write a registry entry, launch a process, open a socket, etc) - beware proxy APIs in brokers/elevated privilege processes | ||
*flaws in system services could be exploited from an isolated process | *flaws in system services could be exploited from an isolated process | ||
*malicious or flawed full-privilege add-ons or plugins | *malicious or flawed full-privilege add-ons or plugins | ||