Security/ProcessIsolation/ThreatModel: Difference between revisions

 
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*theft of local and network files via file:// and related schemes
*theft of local and network files via file:// and related schemes
*theft of local data via direct access to database or database files
*theft of local data via direct access to database or database files
==== Assets at Risk ====
* local files, registry entries, etc.
* network files (NFS, SMB)
* intranet servers / services


==Cross-domain Compromise==
==Cross-domain Compromise==
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*A compromised process could persist after navigating to a different FQDN  
*A compromised process could persist after navigating to a different FQDN  
*Overwrite cached content
*Overwrite cached content
====Assets at Risk====
*Cookies and other session tokens
*Saved passwords
*Web content and data
*Cache


==Cross-domain Data Theft==
==Cross-domain Data Theft==
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Plugins are not planned to be sandboxed yet, since they require their own broker architecture, mostly due to challenges around:
Plugins are not planned to be sandboxed yet, since they require their own broker architecture, mostly due to challenges around:


- filesystem access (file uploads, downloads, media playback)
* filesystem access (file uploads, downloads, media playback)
- auto-update
* auto-update
- potentially registry and network access (binary sockets, etc) - or allow them unlimited access
* potentially registry and network access (binary sockets, etc) - or allow them unlimited access


==General threats==
==General pitfalls==


*Some Windows processes don't respect token privileges, they clone their own token based upon the user with default permissions (task manager is an example)
*Some Windows processes don't respect token privileges, they clone their own token based upon the user with default permissions (task manager is an example)
*Some services allow anyone to talk to them regardless of restrictions (Telnet service for example)
*Some services allow anyone to talk to them regardless of restrictions (Telnet service for example)
*There are a lot of DLLs in Windows that inject themselves into a process (like renderer) that can't deal with restricted rights tokens, so they crash or behave inappropriately (leave handles open, etc).
*There are a lot of DLLs in Windows that inject themselves into a process (like renderer) that can't deal with restricted rights tokens, so they crash or behave inappropriately (leave handles open, etc).
*Never patch a process that's already running
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