CA/Subordinate CA Checklist: Difference between revisions

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Root certificate authorities should use a separate and distinct root to sign third-party private subordinate CAs, and such roots should not be submitted for inclusion in NSS. Then if the owner of the subordinate CA later decides to create a profit center and start signing site certificates of unaffiliated entities, those site certificates will not chain back up to a root in NSS.  With a separate and distinct root not submitted for inclusion in NSS, there would be no need to disclose any information about those third-party private subordinate CAs.
Root certificate authorities should use a separate and distinct root to sign third-party private subordinate CAs, and such roots should not be submitted for inclusion in NSS. Then if the owner of the subordinate CA later decides to create a profit center and start signing site certificates of unaffiliated entities, those site certificates will not chain back up to a root in NSS.  With a separate and distinct root not submitted for inclusion in NSS, there would be no need to disclose any information about those third-party private subordinate CAs.


== Third-Party Public Subordinate CAs ==
== Subordinate CAs that are not Technically Constrained ==


This section applies when your root signs subordinate CAs for companies who use the sub-CA to sign other sub-CAs or certificates for other companies or individuals not affiliated with their company. For instance, this section applies to you if your root issues sub-CAs that are used by Certificate Service Providers (CSP).
All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates, that are not technically constrained as described in item #9 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy], and that directly or transitively chain to a certificate included in Mozilla's CA Certificate Program MUST be audited in accordance with [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Policy] and MUST be publicly disclosed by the CA that has their certificate included in Mozilla's CA Certificate Program.  


In addition to the information listed above, you will also need to provide the following information for each CSP.
If a CA's policies allow the CA to have subordinate CAs that are operated by third parties, then the following information must be provided.
 
# General description of the sub-CAs operated by third parties.
# Selection criteria for sub-CAs
#* The types of organizations that apply to operate a sub-CA
#* The approval process for sub-CAs
#* The verification procedures applied to sub-CAs
# The CP/CPS that the sub-CAs are required to follow.
# Requirements (technical and contractual) for sub-CAs in regards to whether or not sub-CAs are constrained to issue certificates only within certain domains, and whether or not sub-CAs can create their own subordinates.
# Requirements (typically in the CP or CPS) for sub-CAs to take reasonable measures to verify the ownership of the domain name and email address for end-entity certificates chaining up to the root, as per section 7 of our [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ Mozilla CA certificate policy.]
#* domain ownership/control
#* email address ownership/control
#* digitally signing code objects -- entity submitting the certificate signing request is the same entity referenced in the certificate
# Description of audit requirements for sub-CAs (typically in the CP or CPS)
#*Whether or not the root CA audit includes the sub-CAs.
#*Who can perform the audits for sub-CAs.
#*Frequency of the audits for sub-CAs.
 
 
In addition to the information listed above, the CA must provide the following information for each subordinate CA certificate that is not technically constrained as described in item #9 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion Policy].


# Sub-CA Company Name
# Sub-CA Company Name
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#* OV: Both the Organization and the ownership/control of the Domain Name are verified.  
#* OV: Both the Organization and the ownership/control of the Domain Name are verified.  
# Review the CP/CPS for [http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices Potentially Problematic Practices.] Provide further info when a potentially problematic practice is found.
# Review the CP/CPS for [http://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices Potentially Problematic Practices.] Provide further info when a potentially problematic practice is found.
# If the root CA audit does not include this sub-CA, then for this sub-CA provide a publishable statement or letter from an auditor that meets the requirements of sections 9, 10, and 11 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion policy.]
# If the root CA audit does not include this sub-CA, then for this sub-CA provide a publishable statement or letter from an auditor that meets the requirements of sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/InclusionPolicy.html Mozilla's CA Certificate Inclusion policy.]
# Provide information about the CRL update frequency for end-entity certificates. There should be a statement in the CP/CPS that the sub-CA must follow to the effect that the CRL for end-entity certs is updated whenever a cert is revoked, and at least every 24 or 36 hours.
# Provide information about the CRL update frequency for end-entity certificates. There should be a statement in the CP/CPS that the sub-CA must follow to the effect that the CRL for end-entity certs is updated whenever a cert is revoked, and at least every 24 or 36 hours.
# If this sub-CA provides OCSP, then a test must be done to make sure that their OCSP responder works within the Firefox browser. Provide the url to a website whose SSL cert chains up to this sub-CA and has the AIA extension referencing the OCSP responder. The Mozilla representative will perform the following check:
# If this sub-CA provides OCSP, then a test must be done to make sure that their OCSP responder works within the Firefox browser. Provide the url to a website whose SSL cert chains up to this sub-CA and has the AIA extension referencing the OCSP responder. The Mozilla representative will perform the following check:
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