CA/Subordinate CA Checklist: Difference between revisions

[https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#53-intermediate-certificates Mozilla’s Root Store Policy] encourages CAs to technically constrain subordinate CA certificates using RFC 5280 extensions that are specified directly in the intermediate certificate and controlled by crypto code (e.g. NSS). We recognize that technically constraining subordinate CA certificates in this manner may not be practical in some cases, so the subordinate CA certificates may instead be publicly disclosed, and audited in accordance with Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy.

* The Super-CA’s documented policies and audit criteria meet the requirements of [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#3-documentation Mozilla’s Root Store Policy], which includes the [https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements/ CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements], and includes sufficient information about verification practices and issuance of end-entity certificates.

* The subordinate CAs do not themselves act as a Super-CA or sign a large number of [[CA:SubordinateCA_checklist#Terminology | public third-party subordinate CAs]], making it difficult for Mozilla and others to annually confirm that the full CA hierarchy is in compliance with [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ Mozilla’s Root Store Policy].

#* Section 5.3 of [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#53-intermediate-certificates Mozilla's Root Store Policy]

#* The CA/Browser Forum's [https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/ Baseline Requirements]

# Requirements (documented in the CP or CPS) for sub-CAs to take required and reasonable measures to verify the ownership of the domain name and email address for end-entity certificates chaining up to the root.

All certificates that are capable of being used to issue new certificates, that are not technically constrained as described in section 5.3 of [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#53-intermediate-certificates Mozilla's Root Store Policy], and that directly or transitively chain to a certificate included in Mozilla's CA Certificate Program MUST be audited in accordance with [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#3-documentation Mozilla's Root Store Policy] and MUST be publicly disclosed by the CA that has their certificate included in Mozilla's CA Certificate Program.  

In addition to the information listed above, the CA must provide the following information for each third-party subordinate CA certificate that is not technically constrained.

# The section numbers and text (in English) in the CP/CPS that demonstrate that required and reasonable measures are taken to verify the ownership of the domain name and email address for end-entity certificates chaining up to the root.

# If the root CA audits do not include this sub-CA, then for this sub-CA provide a publishable statement or letter from an auditor that meets the requirements of [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#3-documentation Mozilla's Root Store Policy.]

In order to best ensure the safety and security of Mozilla users, Mozilla has a single consistent [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy policy] that describes the expectations for all CAs that will be trusted within its program. Mozilla requires that all participating root CAs fully disclose their hierarchy, including CP, CPS, and audits, when said hierarchy is capable of issuance.

If you have intermediate certificates for which you cannot disclose this information, whether it be for personal, operational, or legal reasons, then an appropriate solution, consistent with [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy#53-intermediate-certificates Mozilla Root Store Policy], is to use Technically Constrained Subordinate CAs (TCSCAs) - as defined within the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements and as reflected within Mozilla's policy. Such TCSCAs are technically limited from the issuance of TLS/SSL certificates, and by doing so, are allowed to be operated without full [[CA:SalesforceCommunity#Which_intermediate_certificate_data_should_CAs_add_to_Salesforce.3F|public disclosure of their CP, CPS, and audit documentation]].