CA/Additional Trust Changes: Difference between revisions
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While not technically a modification to the root store as we don't use it for un-trusting roots, Mozilla's [https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-intermediate-certificates-introducing-onecrl/ OneCRL] system is used for communicating information about the revocation of intermediate certificates (and high-profile misissued end-entity certificates) to Firefox clients. | While not technically a modification to the root store as we don't use it for un-trusting roots, Mozilla's [https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/03/revoking-intermediate-certificates-introducing-onecrl/ OneCRL] system is used for communicating information about the revocation of intermediate certificates (and high-profile misissued end-entity certificates) to Firefox clients. | ||
==ANSSI== | ==ANSSI== | ||
Revision as of 12:55, 1 February 2018
The Mozilla Root Program's official repository of the roots it trusts is certdata.txt. Some information about the level of trust in each root is included in that file - for example, whether it's trusted for server SSL, S/MIME or both. However, not all restrictions recommended by Mozilla on the roots can be or are encoded in certdata.txt. Some are implemented in our security library, "NSS", or in Firefox and Thunderbird (so-called "PSM").
Sometimes, other companies and organizations decide to use Mozilla's root store in their products. As the CA FAQ notes, Mozilla does not promise to take into account the needs of other users of its root store when making decisions. However, for the benefit of such users and on a best-efforts basis, this page documents the additional trust settings that Mozilla recommends.
Extended Validation (EV)
The status of whether a root is approved to issue EV certificates or not is stored in PSM rather than certdata.txt.
OneCRL
While not technically a modification to the root store as we don't use it for un-trusting roots, Mozilla's OneCRL system is used for communicating information about the revocation of intermediate certificates (and high-profile misissued end-entity certificates) to Firefox clients.
ANSSI
The French Government CA is name-constrained to those ccTLDs whose geographies are under the jurisdiction of France - that is, .fr, .gp, .gf, .mq, .re, .yt, .pm, .bl, .mf, .wf, .pf, .nc, and .tf. The code for that is in NSS.
Kamu SM
The Turkish Government CA is name-constrained to a set of turkish toplevel domains - that is, .gov.tr, .k12.tr, .pol.tr, .mil.tr, .tsk.tr, .kep.tr, .bel.tr, .edu.tr and .org.tr. The code for that is in NSS.
Symantec
Symantec certificate issued before 1 June 2016 are distrusted starting in Firefox 60 unless they are issued by certain whitelisted intermediate CAs (Bug 1409257). This is in accordance with the distrust plan of 2017.