NSSCryptoModuleSpec/Section 9: Self Tests

Note: This is a draft - A work in progress! - Not official.

Document Description	DTR Section	Assessment	Status
List every error state & error indicator - Document all error states associated with each self-test, and indicate for each error state the expected error indicator.	VE.09.04.01	Failure of any of the power-up, conditional, or operator-initiated self-tests causes the cryptographic module to enter the Error state (State 3 ). If the pairwise consistency test fails, the FC_GenerateKeyPair function returns the error code CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. If any other self-test fails, the PKCS #11 function returns the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR. When the cryptographic module is in the Error state, most PKCS #11 functions (including all the functions that perform cryptographic operations) do nothing and return the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR. See also the Show Status service of the cryptographic module. CKR_DEVICE_ERROR Cryptographic module is in the Error state, or has entered the Error state because a self-test (other than the pairwise consistency test) fails. CKR_GENERAL_ERROR Cryptographic module has entered the Error state because the pairwise consistency test fails.	Draft
Module in Error State: Ensure that cryptographic operations cannot be performed and all data output via the data output interface is inhibited while the module is in the error state. See VE02.06.01 for the vendor design requirement.	VE.09.05.01 VE.09.06.01	Power-up self-test: PKCS #11 Initialization: During the PKCS #11 initialization of the FIPS 140-2 module, any error return from the battery of self-tests will put the module in the Error state. The Error state will inhibit further cryptographic operations (see In Error State). Output from the cryptographic module is via two paths: 1) the return code of the cryptographic function and, 2) buffers and objects which are operated on by the function, the locations of which are passed as function arguments. In the Error state the return code is always CKR_DEVICE_ERROR. No action besides setting the return code is taken by the requested function, which prevents data output of the second type.	Draft
List and describe the power-up & conditional self-tests performed by the module	VE.09.07.01 VE.09.13.01 VE.09.16.01 VE.09.18.01 VE.09.18.02 VE.09.19.01 VE.09.19.02 VE.09.20.01	Power-Up Selftests Conditional self-tests Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys) Continuous random number generator test These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.	Draft
For each error condition, document the actions neccessary to clear the condition and resume normal operation.	VE.09.07.02	The cryptographic module has only one Error state, which is entered when any self-test fails. The error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR returned by cryptographic functions indicates that the module is in the Error state. For the fatal error condition CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, the only way to clear the condition is to shut down and restart the module. Upon restart the power-up tests will be initiated automatically and do not require operator intervention.	Draft
Describe automatic initiation of power-up self-tests requires that the running of power-up self-tests not involve any inputs from or actions by the operator.	VE.09.09.01	When the FC_Initialize function is called, which initializes the PKCS #11 library of the NSS cryptographic module for the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the power-up self-tests are initiated automatically and don't require operator intervention.	Draft
Results of power-up self-tests successful completion indicator for the power-up self-tests.	VE.09.10.01	The FC_Initialize function returns the code CKR_OK upon successful completion of the power-up self-tests.	Draft
Procedure by which an operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand	VE.09.12.01	The operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand by calling the FC_Finalize and FC_Initialize functions to shut down and restart the module.	Draft
specify the method used to compare the calculated output with the known answer.	VE.09.17.01	PORT_Memcmp is used to compare the calculated output with the known answer. sftk_fipsPowerUpSelfTest	Draft
Error State when two outputs are not equal.	VE.09.17.02	When the two outputs are not equal, the module enters the Error state (by setting the Boolean state variable sftk_fatalError to true) and returns the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR.	Draft
Independant cryptographic algorithm implemenations	VE.09.20.02	(N/A) The NSS cryptographic module doesn't include two independent implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm.	Draft
Integrity test for software components	VE.09.22.01 VE.09.22.02 VE.09.22.03	The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is used as the Approved authentication technique (validation certificate# 172) for the integrity test of the software components. Software components protected using the digital signatures are the softoken (PKCS #11) and freebl libraries (e.g., libsoftokn3.so and libfreebl3.so). When the softoken and freebl libraries are built, a DSA public/private key pair is generated, the private key is used to generate a DSA signature of the library, and the public key and signature are stored in a file with the name libraryname.chk. When the self-test is initiated (e.g., at initialization for the FIPS mode), the module verifies the signatures (in the libraryname.chk files) of the softoken and freebl libraries. If the signature verification fails, the self-test fails. FC_Initialize calls nsc_CommonInitialize and then the DSA signature is verified before the library initialization is allowed to proceed.	Draft
EDC for software integrity	VE.09.24.01	(N/A)
Critical functions test	VE.09.27.01	The critical security functions of the cryptographic module are: Random number generation. Used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by Approved cryptographic algorithms. Tested by the power-up random number generator known-answer test and the conditional continuous random number generator test. Operation of the cryptographic algorithms. Used for encryption, decryption, and authentication. Tested by the power-up cryptographic algorithm tests and the conditional pairwise consistency test (when the module generates public and private keys).	Draft
Key transport method	VE.09.31.01	RSA encryption (Key Wrapping using RSA keys) is the only key transport method that VE.09.31.01 applies to. The pairwise consistency check, as defined in AS09.31, is implemented in the sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck function. See the source code under the comment "Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt."	Draft
Digital signatures	VE.09.33.01	The sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck function of the module tests the pairwise consistency of the public and private keys used for digital signatures by the calculation and verification of a signature. If the signature cannot be verified, the test fails. See the source code under the comment "Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify."	Draft
Approved authentication technique used for the software/firmware load test	VE.09.35.01 VE.09.35.02	N/A. No software or firmware components can be externally loaded into the cryptographic module.	Draft
Manual Key Entry Test	VE.09.40.01 VE.09.40.02	(N/A) The cryptographic module does not support manual key entry.
Random number generator is implemented, document the continuous RNG test performed	VE.09.42.01 VE.09.43.01	The module performs the continuous random number generator test on the Approved RNG. In the alg_fips186_2_cn_1 function, if the 320-bit block x_j matches the previous 320-bit block rng->Xj (the odds are 2^320), then the status code SECFailure is returned. This will propogate up to calling functions to put the cryptographic module in the Error state. The first block is not used (see the prng_RandomUpdate function) but is saved for comparison with the next block.	Draft
Bypass Test	VE.09.45.01 VE.09.45.02 VE.09.46.01 VE.09.46.02	(N/A) NSS does not implement a bypass service.	Draft

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