WebAPI/Security/Contacts: Difference between revisions
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Potential mitigations: | Potential mitigations: | ||
* Let user configure what data is accessible (globally?) | * Let user configure what data is accessible (globally?) | ||
* Have separate permissions read,create or update/delete? (assuming that | * Have separate permissions read,create or update/delete? (assuming that many apps only want read, and could use web activities to create a contact if necessary?) | ||
many apps only want read, and could use web activities to create a | |||
contact if necessary?) | |||
=== Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party) === | === Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party) === |
Revision as of 12:19, 25 June 2012
Contacts API
Reference:https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/ContactsAPI Brief purpose of API: Access to users contacts.
General Use Cases:N/A
Inherent threats:
- Read/exfiltrate confidential information,
- Destroy user's contact data
- DoS via filling address book with bogus data
Threat severity: high
Regular web content (unauthenticated)
Use cases for unauthenticated code: Mediated access to specific (user selected) contact information
Authorization model for uninstalled web content: OS mediated (web
activities, or trusted UI)
Authorization model for installed web content: OS mediated (web
activities, or trusted UI)
Potential mitigations:
- App requests a contact via web activities or trusted UI
- API provides a local identifier instead of the actual contact information
Trusted (authenticated by publisher)
Use cases for authenticated code: Create, read or edit contact information
Authorization model: Explicit
Potential mitigations:
- Let user configure what data is accessible (globally?)
- Have separate permissions read,create or update/delete? (assuming that many apps only want read, and could use web activities to create a contact if necessary?)
Certified (vouched for by trusted 3rd party)
Use cases for certified code: Create, read or edit contact information
Authorization model: Implicit
Potential mitigations: None