Security/Sandbox/Deny Filesystem Access: Difference between revisions
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== Cross-Platform Blockers == | == Cross-Platform Blockers == | ||
* {{bug|1196384}} - (sandbox-fs) [meta] Cross-platform blockers for default-deny filesystem policy for content processes | |||
** [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/showdependencytree.cgi?id=1196384&hide_resolved=1 Dependency Tree] | |||
== Windows Blockers == | == Windows Blockers == | ||
Revision as of 23:10, 16 May 2016
Status
| Platform | Current Status of Content Filesystem Sandboxing |
|---|---|
| Windows | TBD |
| OS X | Some directories are read/write protected, but this will not provide real security until the bulk of the $HOME directory is fully write protected.
On OS X, the Firefox Profile directory is stored within ~/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/. ~/Library is read/write protected with a few exceptions for some specific subdirectories. Access to $HOME and other areas of the filesystem is not restricted. i.e., the content process can read and write to/from anywhere the OS permits: $HOME and temporary directories. The ~/Library read/write prevention could be bypassed because the rest of the $HOME is read/write accessible. For example, a compromised process could add malicious commands to ~/.login-type files to copy data from ~/Library when a user logs in. |
| Linux | No filesystem policy enabled |
| Other | No filesystem policy enabled |
Blockers
Cross-Platform Blockers
- bug 1196384 - (sandbox-fs) [meta] Cross-platform blockers for default-deny filesystem policy for content processes