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Second, plugins themselves will happily provide websites with a large amount of identifying information about a user, including their list of installed fonts, their CPU model and speed, their local interface IP addresses, username, hostname, and so on. In addition, plugins can also have their own data and cookie stores, that they allow websites to manipulate. | Second, plugins themselves will happily provide websites with a large amount of identifying information about a user, including their list of installed fonts, their CPU model and speed, their local interface IP addresses, username, hostname, and so on. In addition, plugins can also have their own data and cookie stores, that they allow websites to manipulate. | ||
The best course of action may be to develop an independent policy for what plugins are allowed to do in anonymous and private browsing modes with respect to the above information. Any plugins that do not advertise their adherence to this policy should be disabled during the mode. | The best course of action may be to develop an independent policy for what plugins are allowed to do in anonymous and private browsing modes with respect to the above information. Any plugins that do not advertise their adherence to this policy should be disabled during the mode. This is obviously a long-term strategy. | ||
Similarly, another option might be to leverage the out of process execution of plugins to restrict their ability to access the local system while the mode is enabled. | |||
Shorter-term, it may be best to leverage the permissions manager to disable all plugins by default. If an object tag or an access to window.plugins is detected, the chrome could ask the user if they would like to enable that plugin for that top-level domain only. Keeping plugin permissions isolated to the top-level urlbar domain would at least cut down on linkability between domains. | |||
==Extensions/Add-Ons== | ==Extensions/Add-Ons== |
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