CA:MaintenanceAndEnforcement: Difference between revisions

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#* The Certificate Manager displays the Actively Distrusted certificate in the same manner as other certificates, and the trust bits may be manually turned on by users.
#* The Certificate Manager displays the Actively Distrusted certificate in the same manner as other certificates, and the trust bits may be manually turned on by users.


== Concerns ==
= Concerns =
The current way to actively distrust a certificate has the following problems.


* Certs with weak RSA keys or insufficient key usage can be used maliciously until we implement {{Bug|360126}} and {{Bug|725351}}.
* If the certificate to be distrusted is cross-signed by another certificate in NSS, then the Serial Number and Issuer for that certificate chain also has to be distrusted. This is error-prone, even if we ask every CA in Mozilla's program if they have cross-signed with the certificate to be distrusted.
* If the certificate to be distrusted is cross-signed by another certificate in NSS, then the Serial Number and Issuer for that certificate chain also has to be distrusted. This is error-prone, even if we ask every CA in Mozilla's program if they have cross-signed with the certificate to be distrusted.
** Possible Scenario: A cross-signing relationship is overlooked, so the malicious certificate continues to be trusted even after the security update.
** Possible Scenario: A cross-signing relationship is overlooked, so the malicious certificate continues to be trusted even after the security update.
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