NSSCryptoModuleSpec/Section 9: Self Tests
Note: This is a draft - A work in progress! - Not official.
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Document Description |
DTR Section |
Assessment |
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List every error state & error indicator - Document all error states associated with each self-test, and indicate for each error state the expected error indicator. |
VE.09.04.01 |
Failure of any of the power-up, conditional, or operator-initiated self-tests causes the cryptographic module to enter the Error state (State 3 ). When the cryptographic module is in the Error state, most functions (including all the cryptographic functions) do nothing and return the error code
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Module in Error State: Ensure that cryptographic operations cannot be performed and all data output via the data output interface is inhibited while the module is in the error state. See VE02.06.01 for the vendor design requirement. |
Power-up self-test: PKCS #11 Initialization: During the PKCS #11 initialization of the FIPS 140-2 module, any error return from the battery of self-tests will put the module in the Error state. The Error state will inhibit further cryptographic operations (In Error State ). Output from the cryptographic module is via two paths: 1) the return code of the cryptographic function and, 2) buffers and objects which are operated on by the function, the locations of which are passed as function arguments. In the Error state the return code is always |
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List of power-up & conditional self-tests performed by the module |
The module can perform the following self-tests:
These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. |
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For each error condition, document the actions neccessary to clear the condition and resume normal operation. |
VE.09.07.02 |
The cryptographic module has only one Error state, which is entered when any self-test fails. The error code |
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Describe automatic initiation of power-up self-tests requires that the running of power-up self-tests not involve any inputs from or actions by the operator. |
VE.09.09.01 |
When the |
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Cryptographic Algorithms Known Answer Test successful completion indicator for the power-up self-tests. |
VE.09.10.01 |
Power Up Self Test Code This is demonstrated throughout the self test module. Each of the following functions declares static key material at the beginning of each test and upon successful completion returns CKR_OK: sftk_fips_DES3_PowerUpSelfTest |
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Procedure by which an operator can initiate the power-up self-tests |
VE.09.12.01 |
The products will not have a user visible way to initiate these tests other than restarting the program. |
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All self tests shall use a known answer. |
VE.09.13.01 |
A known answer shall be conducted for all cryptographic functions (e.g., encryption, decryption, authentication and random number generation) of each Approved cryptographic algorithm self test. |
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If the calculated output does not equal the known answer, the known-answer test shall fail. |
VE.09.16.01 |
CKR_DEVICE_ERROR is returned when ever the calculated output does not equal the known answer. |
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specify the method used to compare the calculated output with the known answer. |
PORT_Memcmp is used to compare the computed cipher text with the known ciphertext. sftk_fipsPowerUpSelfTest When keys are used for encryption/decryption the 'Pairwise Consistency Check Self Tests' are used. |
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Error State when two outputs are not equal. |
CKR_DEVICE_ERROR is returned when the two outputs are not equal. |
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Self-Test description for all tests implemented. |
No operator call backs have been implemented at any point within the power-up self tests. These tests are mandatory for the FIPS-140-2 mode of operation. |
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| Independant cryptographic algorithm implemenations | VE.09.20.02 |
(N/A) |
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Integrity test for software components |
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is used as the approved (DSA) authentication technique for the integrity test of the software component. When the softokn and freebl libraries (libsoftokn3/softokn3/libfreebl*) are built a DSA signature checksum is generated and stored in a file with the name libraryname.chk. When the module is in FIPS mode, at initialization the softoken computes checksums for its library and for freebl and compares it with the values in libraryname.chk FC_Initialize calls nsc_CommonInitialize and then the DSS signature is checked before the module is allowed to load.
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| EDC for software integrity | VE.09.24.01 | (N/A) | |||
| Critical Functions |
Random Number Generator Self tests are the Continuous Pseudo-Random Number Self-Tests |
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Key transport method |
RSA encryption is the only FIPS approved key transport method that VE.09.31.01 applies to. See sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck The other key transport/establishment methods either use a symmetric wrapping key (encrypting/wrapping with TDES or AES) or require two public/private key pairs (Diffie-Hellman or its elliptic curve variants). |
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Digital Signature Verification |
Digital signature verification is performed by sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck Consistency Check |
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Approved authentication technique |
No external firmware or software components are externally loaded in the cryptographic module. |
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Manual Key Entry |
(N/A) NSS does not implement manual Key entry | ||||
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Random number generator is implemented, document the continuous RNG test performed |
Continuous Pseudo-Random Number Self-Tests In this code reference, if the SHA-1 hash matches the previous SHA-1 hash (the odds are 2^160), then the error code SECFailure is returned. This will propogate up to calling functions to put the cryptographic module in critical error state. |
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| ByPass Service | (N/A) NSS does not implement a ByPass service. | Draft |
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