Security/Features/PasswordManagerImprovements: Difference between revisions

4) HSTS: If a site is HSTS, then there is no reason to have http data for that site. Hence, if a site is marked HSTS, and the user has any data (cookies, passwords, etc) that are not https-only/secure, immediately mark that data as https-only. (Note that we'd need some way to indicate that the site has been STS for at least X weeks to prevent deleting data from a site that goes HSTS as a beta test and then goes back to non-HSTS.)

If we must allow autofilling in certain cases, then we also need the following security features:

* If an identical password is stored for both the http version and https version of a specific website (or domain), and it is not used on the http site for X months, expire the http version after alerting the user. (This can help in cases where the website has upgraded to https, but the user's http password manager entry still exists and is open to attack).

** Do not give javascript access to any password fields (regardless of whether the password manager saves the password) - the actual password the user enters is only used on submit.  The problem with this is with registration pages that use javascript to test the password strength.  [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=653132 Bug 653132].  Can we detect registration pages?  If a page a registration page has only one password field (they don't ask you to confirm your password by entering it twice) do they really use javascript to test password strength?  Since they aren't asking you to confirm your password, they probably aren't too concerned with special characters.

|Feature ux design=* What should the UX be when we do not autofill?

*# Today the experience is that the user first has to type the username, and then the password will be filled in. [NB: it fails utterly on "password-only" forms (where the username is known to the site already, such as by a cookie) because there's no username field interaction to trigger the fill-in]