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Pierreozoux (talk | contribs) (OCSP Stapling support: Adds script for automatic OCSP in HAProxy (Sorry, didn't know about the discussion page)) |
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== | == Proposed changes to ciphersuites == | ||
This | This change was proposed by zwdg on IRC. | ||
<pre> | |||
Modern: | |||
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 | |||
Intermediate: | |||
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA | |||
Old: | |||
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA | |||
gnutls: | |||
NONE:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+ECDHE-ECDSA:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-256-GCM:+AES-128-CBC:+AES-256-CBC:+SIGN-ECDSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-ECDSA-SHA384:+SIGN-RSA-SHA384:+SIGN-ECDSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+CURVE-SECP521R1:+CURVE-SECP384R1:+CURVE-SECP256R1:+AEAD:+SHA384:+SHA256:+SHA1:+COMP-NULL | |||
</pre> | |||
With the following comments: | |||
<pre> | |||
< zwdg> GCM modes are the only ones without known crypto vulnerabilities. CBC in TLSv1.2 is secure, but the block mode of operation has some theoretical problems. | |||
< zwdg> only AEAD cipher suits have no vulnerabilities, and all modern browsers and tools are compatible with them, hence they should be the only ones in modern | |||
< zwdg> I evaluated [the ciphersuites] with browsers, crypto tools, and java | |||
10:01 < zwdg> for intermediate, just add the CBC modes, SHA1, and TLSv1.0 to the modern list I posted, and for old just add 3des plus SSLv3 | |||
</pre> | |||
== IIS == | == IIS == |