Security/Sandbox/Deny Filesystem Access: Difference between revisions

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| {{bug|922481}} e10s: remote the file:// protocol || Blocks disabling read access to $HOME and other locations ||
| {{bug|922481}} e10s: remote the file:// protocol || Blocks disabling read access to $HOME and other locations ||
# A compromised content process shouldn't be able to read arbitrary files, but when the user does File->Open or uses a file:/// URI, that must continue to work.
# A compromised content process shouldn't be able to read arbitrary files, but when the user does File->Open or uses a file:/// URI, that must continue to work  


Another approach to this is to open file:// URI's in the chrome process.
Another approach to this is to open file:// URI's in the chrome process.


A content process that has read or write access to a local file (even indirectly through the parent), shouldn't also be used for web content. So it follows that more than one content process would be needed.
If a content process that has read or write access to a local file (even indirectly through the parent) shouldn't also be used for web content, it follows that more than one content process would be needed. See {{bug|1147911}} Use a separate content process for file:// URLs.
 
If file:// access is remoted to the parent, could the contents of the URL bar be used to determine the allowable scope and accept/reject files as necessary? (Discussed previously by :billm, :bobowen.)
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| {{bug|1090454}} Trigger print jobs from the parent instead of the child when printing from a remote browser || Blocks disabling write access to $HOME and other locations ||
| {{bug|1090454}} Trigger print jobs from the parent instead of the child when printing from a remote browser || Blocks disabling write access to $HOME and other locations ||
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