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CA/Symantec Issues: Difference between revisions
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Tweaks to Issue L
(Add Issue E) |
(Tweaks to Issue L) |
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It is concerning that their first experience with SHA-1 misissuance did not cause them to analyse their systems and find this potential problem, or to put in place SHA-1 blocks in enough places to catch this. | It is concerning that their first experience with SHA-1 misissuance did not cause them to analyse their systems and find this potential problem, or to put in place SHA-1 blocks in enough places to catch this. | ||
==Issue L: Cross-Signing the US Federal Bridge ( | ==Issue L: Cross-Signing the US Federal Bridge (February 2011 - July 2016)== | ||
The US Government has an extremely complicated PKI called the Federal PKI. It has [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=478418 applied for inclusion] in the Mozilla root store but that application seemed unlikely ever to be successful due to the difficulty of bringing the entire FPKI in line with Mozilla's policies. At the time of this incident, it had a number of non-audited subordinate CAs. | The US Government has an extremely complicated PKI called the Federal PKI. It has [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=478418 applied for inclusion] in the Mozilla root store but that application seemed unlikely ever to be successful due to the difficulty of bringing the entire FPKI in line with Mozilla's policies. At the time of this incident, it had a number of non-audited subordinate CAs. | ||
Since February 2011, Symantec has regularly had a valid cross-sign for one or both of "[https://crt.sh/?caid=1324 Federal Bridge CA]" and "[https://crt.sh/?caid=1410 Federal Bridge CA 2013]", which are both part of the FPKI, thereby making certificates below those roots in the chain of trust be publicly trusted, and technically making Symantec responsible to Mozilla for all certificates issued in the covered part of the FPKI, including any BR violations. The intermediate CA certificate(s) concerned were not disclosed in the CCADB, as Mozilla practice at the time required. This was [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/0wSUJKnH5MY/PGhVbV-UBQAJ reported in m.d.s.policy]. | |||
Symantec is not the only CA to have done this; IdenTrust [https://crt.sh/?id=9114292 also did it]. | Symantec is not the only CA to have done this; IdenTrust [https://crt.sh/?id=9114292 also did it on multiple occasions] from 2011-01-14 onwards. I don't believe there are any unexpired unrevoked (by OneCRL) links between the FPKI and the Mozilla trust store any more, via any CA. | ||
===Symantec Response=== | ===Symantec Response=== | ||
When this was drawn to their attention, Symantec [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/0wSUJKnH5MY/OAJD-tWBAAAJ did not revoke] the cross-sign, instead allowing it to expire (less than a month later). | When this was drawn to their attention, Symantec [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/0wSUJKnH5MY/OAJD-tWBAAAJ did not revoke] the cross-sign certificate under discussion, instead allowing it to expire (less than a month later). | ||
==Issue N: Premature Manual Signing Using SHA-1 (July 2016)== | ==Issue N: Premature Manual Signing Using SHA-1 (July 2016)== | ||
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Symantec's RAs appear to have had a history of poor compliance with the BRs and other audit requirements, facts which were known to Symantec but not disclosed to Mozilla or dealt with in appropriately comprehensive ways. | Symantec's RAs appear to have had a history of poor compliance with the BRs and other audit requirements, facts which were known to Symantec but not disclosed to Mozilla or dealt with in appropriately comprehensive ways. | ||
Over multiple years ([https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/symantec-webtrust-audit-report.pdf 2013-12-01 to 2014-11-30], [ | Over multiple years ([https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/symantec-webtrust-audit-report.pdf 2013-12-01 to 2014-11-30], [n 2014-12-01 to 2015-11-30]), Symantec's "GeoTrust" audits were qualified to say that they did not have proper audit information for some of these RAs. This information was in their management assertions, and repeated in the audit findings. So the poor audit situation was ongoing and known. Also, other audit reports, despite being in hierarchies accessible for issuance by the same RAs, did not have similar qualifications ([https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/Symantec-STN-WTCA-2015.pdf Symantec Trust Network, 2014-12-01 to 2015-11-30]). | ||
We currently know of four RAs who were in Symantec's program - CrossCert, Certisign, Certsuperior, and Certisur. | We currently know of four RAs who were in Symantec's program - CrossCert, Certisign, Certsuperior, and Certisur. | ||