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CA:MaintenanceAndEnforcement: Difference between revisions
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* Certs that have been mistakenly issued with weak RSA keys or insufficient key usage can be used maliciously until we implement {{Bug|360126}} and {{Bug|725351}}. | * Certs that have been mistakenly issued with weak RSA keys or insufficient key usage can be used maliciously until we implement {{Bug|360126}} and {{Bug|725351}}. | ||
* The code patch to distrust a cert should only disclose the necessary information; {{Bug|826640}}. | |||
* If the certificate to be distrusted is cross-signed by another certificate in NSS, then the Serial Number and Issuer for that certificate chain also has to be distrusted. This is error-prone, even if we ask every CA in Mozilla's program if they have cross-signed with the certificate to be distrusted. | * If the certificate to be distrusted is cross-signed by another certificate in NSS, then the Serial Number and Issuer for that certificate chain also has to be distrusted. This is error-prone, even if we ask every CA in Mozilla's program if they have cross-signed with the certificate to be distrusted. | ||
** Possible Scenario: A cross-signing relationship is overlooked, so the malicious certificate continues to be trusted even after the security update. | ** Possible Scenario: A cross-signing relationship is overlooked, so the malicious certificate continues to be trusted even after the security update. | ||